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I. INTRODUCTION
Personal e-mails, electronic diaries, trade secrets, and other personal
data rapidly fill hard drives, network servers, and the Internet. As these
private and confidential thoughts continuously pour into electronic form,
there is a growing need for electronic security and privacy. Millions of
Americans use computers to store their personal, private, and confidential
information. Additionally, six out of every ten American households
regularly use their access to the Internet to share documents, send e-mails,
and research.' In this rapidly growing age of cyberspace and electronic
document dependency, encryption offers a way to protect files from prying
eyes by locking electronic documents and allowing computer users to select
who will have the ability to read them. However, while encryption offers a
practical way to protect documents in digital form, an erroneous
interpretation of encryption's importance, process, and constitutionally
relevant factors could effectively delete the need and expectation of privacy
that encryption currently offers.
Whether or not encryption is afforded constitutional protection will
affect numerous areas of our lives. "In this electronic and digital age, the
ability of a speaker and a selected audience to communicate in
confidence ... may be critical to the survival of free speech and privacy."2
Moreover, in the digital age, there are very few options one can choose from
to make a document or communication private. Encryption provides a high
level of security and privacy by restricting access to files to only those that
have an electronic key.3 This security option may have myriad effects:
Cryptography has created new opportunities to protect our private
communications and intimate information so that this electronic
medium can continue to grow. Industry and commerce can prosper
with the assurance that information and trade secrets can be
transferred electronically with security. However, the increasing
popularity of encryption technology has raised the ire of the
government in the name of national security. In an effort to control
the rapid growth of cryptography, the government has enacted laws
controlling cryptography's development and dissemination. The
laws have the effect of inhibiting the free flow of ideas among
1. See Amanda Cantrell, Growth of Internet Access Slows Dramatically in U.S., The Industry
Standard, at http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,28692,00.html (Aug. 27, 2002) and on file
with author. According to this survey, it was recently discovered that fifty-eight percent of all
Americans had Internet access at home as of July 2001 compared with 52 percent in July 2000 and
39 percent the year before. Id.
2. John A. Fraser Il, The Use of Encrypted, Coded and Secret Communications is an "Ancient
Liberty" Protected by the United States Constitution, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH 2, 2 (1997).
3. See discussion infra Section II.
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people who wish to communicate in this manner. The existing laws
remove an entire area of communication from public debate and
pose the potential to bar the First Amendment from electronic
communication.4
As computers continue to network, encryption may be the only way for
users to protect their documents and ensure that they control the access to
their files. In a sense, encryption offers a cyber-safe where one can store
one's digital belongings. Reliance on protections such as individual
computer accounts, password protection, and encryption of data should be
no less reasonable than reliance upon locks and bolts, even though each form
of protection is penetrable.5
The sections of this article are divided to provide discrete reasons why
encryption is, and should be, protected by law. At the outset, Section II
gives a general overview of the encryption process and highlights the power
encryption technology. 6  It becomes apparent when understanding the
encryption process that utilizing encryption is a considerably reliable way to
protect electronic data. Section III offers a historic prospective on the uses
of encryption.7 It demonstrates that the framers of the United States
Constitution readily used encryption technology to protect their
communications and afford themselves privacy. Section IV defines the
evolution of the right to privacy.8 This section provides a foundation for
why the Fourth Amendment's evolution is developing toward protecting
encrypted data. Section V specifically responds to an article recently written
by Professor Orin Kerr9, who argues that encrypted data is not
constitutionally protected.10 This section goes through three of the main
cases that Professor Kerr cites and discusses why they do not support his
proposition when applied to the current uses of encryption and electronic
documents. Section V also reveals that the Court might already be on a path
to giving encrypted documents privacy protection. Finally, Section VI will
explain why the lock-and-key analogy is valid. It will show how the
4. Norman Andrew Cramin, Bernstein, Karn, and Junger: Constitutional Challenges to
Cryptographic Regulations, 50 ALA. L. REV. 869, 870 (1999).
5. Randolph S. Sergent, Note, A Fourth Amendment Model for Computer Networks and Data
Privacy, 81 VA. L. REV. 1181, 1200 (1995).
6. See infra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 39-87 and accompanying text.
9. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment in Cyberspace: Can Encryption Create a "Reasonable
Expectation of Privacy?, "33 CoNN. L. REV. 503 (2000).
10. See infra notes 88-144 and accompanying text.
analogy allows easy translation from the Fourth Amendment protection that
the Court has granted physically locked containers to digitally encrypted
documents that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy."
II. THE ENCRYPTION PROCESS
It is important to understand the process and sophistication of
encryption in order to understand the amount of privacy and security that is
afforded by this cyber technology. In general, the process of encryption
cloaks a document by making it effectively invisible to any computer or
person that does not possess the correct encryption key. 12 Once a document
is encrypted, it can be transmitted through the Internet, shared with other
users over a network, or left on a personal computer, all with the owner of
the document having control of exactly who can access the document's
contents. 13
A. Encryption Generally
Encryption works by employing "complex algorithms to mix characters
of a message with other characters or values in a seemingly nonsensical
way."'14 This results in an electronic file that is "gibberish" to anyone that
does not possess the password or encryption key necessary to decode the
file.' 5 This basic process is employed in storing, transmitting, or creating
information in a form that appears hidden from unauthorized users. 16 The
plaintext, or original message or document, is "scrambled using a software
11. See infra notes 145-156 and accompanying text.
12. Andrew B. Berman, International Divergence: The "'Keys" To Signing On The Digital
Line-The Cross-Border Recognition Of Electronic Contracts And Digital Signatures, 28 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 125, 128 (2001) (providing a general overview of the encryption process and its
effectiveness to protect documents). For additional information on the encryption process, see
generally Kerr, supra note 9, at 510 (giving a basic overview of the process of encryption and
cryptology without focusing specifically on electronic documents and the Interet); James W. Butler,
111, Safe And Legal E-Commerce: Legal and Regulatory Issues Raised by the Use and Export of
Encryption Technology, 611 PRACT. LAW INST. 935, 939-48 (2000) (providing a basic overview of
the digital encryption process as it is used by the lay computer user with a good description of
encryption vocabulary and computer terms).
13. Berman, supra note 12, at 128.
14. Alex Salkever, Uncle Sam Should Learn to Hack, Banning the export of encryption software
won 't hamper terrorists' ability to communicate. There are better ways to plumb their secrets, Bus.
WK. ONLINE, Oct. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WL 25755236 (arguing that encryption provides a
lock-tight method of protecting documents that would take supercomputers hundreds of years to
decipher). See generally SIMON StNGH, THE CODE BOOK: THE EVOLUTION OF SECRECY FROM
MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTS, TO QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY (1999).
15. Salkever, supra note 14.
16. Crypto primer: A Simple Explanation of Encryption, at http://www.techtv.
com/callforhelp/features/story/ 0,24330,2001052,00.html and on file with author (Nov. 30, 2001).
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application called an encryption engine. '17  The scrambled message is
formed when the engine applies additional mathematical data, also called a
key, to the plaintext. 18 This scrambled message, called ciphertext, makes a
document unintelligible to anyone that does not "have access to the key and
decryption software."'1 9
B. The Encryption Process
Non-electronic based encryption can be exceedingly simplistic and is far
less sophisticated than computer-based encryption used today.2° However,
its process is useful for a basic understanding of how encryption works.
Encryption "can be as simple as substituting numbers for letters: A=I, B=2,
C=3, and so on."21 With this simple encryption scheme, an encrypter can
provide the code to those people whom the encrypter wants to read the
encrypted text.22 Then, anyone with the code can perform the simple act of
substituting the letters in order to figure out the message.23 However, most
modem computers scramble data with such complexity that it is next to
impossible to decipher the encrypted document. In fact, it is estimated that,
with a sophisticated key encoding system, it would be impossible to decode
a document without having a supercomputer work on it for hundreds, or
sometimes thousands, of years.24
Generally, this sophisticated form of encryption is widely used today in
what is called a public key encryption scheme.25 The system of public key
encryption was created to utilize a dual key process: a public key that can be
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRYPTOGRAPHY'S ROLE IN SECURING THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 63 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herb S. Lin eds., National Academy Press, 1996) (describing how
increasing the key size slightly will increase the time it takes a single computer to decipher a
document from a few days to 2,000 years). See also Paul Magnusson, Yes They Certainly Will, BUS.
WK., Nov. 5, 2001, at 90 (noting that a system or document that is protected by a 1,024-bit key code
is impossible to break "without a supercomputer working away for a hundred years").
25. See George V. Hulme, Public Key Encryption Algorithm Is Unveiled Early And Promises
More Industry Tools, INFO.WK., Sept 11., 2000, at 39 (outlining the ubiquity of public key
encryption in the digital age and its uses in cyberspace); Thomas E. Weber, World: Looking at
Technology That Has the Potential To Thwart Terrorists, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2001, at 7
(noting that the most widely used online encryption systems are public key based).
widely known and even published, and a private key that is needed to unlock
the document encoded with the public key.26 This offers ease to the
encryption process and allows many users to encrypt documents. It is
important to understand how this type of encryption is used because it is
typically the encryption technique used in cyberspace. Consider the
following example of how this type of encryption is typically utilized:
Sam completes a message to Ruth in plaintext form. Upon
completion, Sam encodes the message with Ruth's public key.
When Ruth receives the message in ciphertext from Sam, she uses
her private key to decode the message into plaintext. To send a
message back to Sam, Ruth encodes her message with the use of
Sam's public key. Sam then uses his private key to decode the
message.27
In considering this example, it should be noted that the system is
extremely secure. This extreme security comes from the fact that the only
method of breaking the security of the document is "for either Ruth or Sam
to give away their private keys. 28  Moreover, it has been found that
"[p]ublic key cryptographic technology has delivered military-grade
cryptography with the level of security so high that even the ultra-secret,
code-breaking computers at the National Security Agency cannot decipher
the encrypted messages.'
29
C. The Importance of "The Key"
An encryption key provides a unique code that keeps a file protected,
making the key the most important part of the process. The strength of a
coded communication is dependent upon the key, and not the algorithm used
to encode the message.3° Knowledge of the algorithm is worthless without
the key-the key is the only thing that can decrypt the message-so it does
not matter if everyone is using the same algorithm." This becomes
important when understanding why the digital encryption process works like
a typical lock and key in the physical world.32
26. Crain, supra note 4, at 872.
27. Id. (internal citations omitted).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 872.
31. See id
32. See infra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
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It is essential to keep this description of the encryption process in mind
when evaluating whether or not the entire process seems to create a
reasonable expectation of privacy, which will result in a legal protection of
encrypted documents. Analyzing case law with this explanation of
encryption in frame will demonstrate that courts may be on the path to
finding that encrypting documents creates Fourth Amendment protection. In
addition, history surrounding the formation of the constitution demonstrates
that the framers started the legal path of search and seizure protection while
using encryption technology. Extending the understanding of encryption to
the physical world allows for an analogy with a traditional lock and key
mechanism. All of this will provide some insight into how the courts will
rule on encrypted documents.
III. THE FOUNDERS AND ENCRYPTION
Encryption has been used for centuries as a way to keep documents and
communications private.
Constitutional analysis of issues arising from encryption technology
must proceed from the understanding that the generation of actors
that framed the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were
sophisticated users of secret communications, and that they used
secret communications to protect and advance the political
objectives that they most valued.33
The Founders used secret communication methods like encryption (then
a basic cryptology scheme) to hide information from those not intended to
receive the information and to act as a "secure seal. 34  Encryption was
widespread and used essentially to "seal" documents and discussions that
were being communicated.35 It has been recently discovered that many
historic figures used encryption in communications when they intended the
33. Fraser, supra note 2, at 2. See also, Ryan Alan Murr, Comment, Privacy and Encryption in
Cyberspace: First Amendment Challenges to ITAR, EAR and Their Successors, 34 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1401, 1461 (1997). Murr argues that the Framers were proponents of secret communications
and conversations in private. Id. He believes that we should analogize encryption to a "digital
whisper" and see that it is exactly what the Framers were doing during the time they created the
constitution. Id.
34. RALPH E. WEBER, UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC CODES AND CIPHERS, 1775-1938 (1979).
35. See id.
highest amount of privacy.36 From this, it can be inferred that the Founders
recognized the great privacy and security encryption afforded its users.
American history has accordingly demonstrated that citizens have long
enjoyed the use of encryption and other forms of secret writings.37 It has
only been in the last three decades that the government has had the ability to
decipher these writings.38 It seems that while the Founders were afforded
the use of encryption to protect their documents, it should not be the case
that recent technology should evaporate this technique of keeping things
private. While there is no direct evidence to prove that the founders were
specifically thinking of encryption as something to be protected against
government intrusion, it should be recognized that encryption is an ancient
liberty.39
IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY HISTORICALLY AND MODERNLY DEFINED
The Fourth Amendment protects "the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. '40 "The requirement to turn over one's encryption key, a priori
and without any prior showing of probable cause to believe criminal conduct
has taken or will take place, would seem to implicate this most fundamental
concern of the Fourth Amendment.",41 However, does Fourth Amendment
protection really protect digital media that have been encrypted? A look into
original cases of privacy may illustrate the answer.
36. See, e.g., THE ADAMS FAMILY PAPERS, SERIES II, ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCES,
162-63 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1973).
37. Id.
38. Fraser, supra note 2.
39. Id.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
41. David B. Walker, Privacy in the Digital Age: Encryption Policy-A Call for Congressional
Action, 1999 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 3, 44 (1999). Walker argues "[t]he real threat to privacy interests
is that the courts will misapprehend the nature of the technology and will therefore miscategorize
key escrow to place it outside the ambit of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
346
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A. Olmstead v. United States42: History in Transition
The right to privacy was initially stated, in Olmstead v. United States, in
terms of the right to be left alone.43 In that case, federal agents installed
wiretaps in the basement of a suspected bootlegger's building and obtained a
conviction with evidence obtained from the wiretaps' recordings. Although
the majority stated that a party's Fourth Amendment rights could not be
infringed because the wiretapping did not constitute a search and seizure
under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, dissenting Justice Brandeis
feared that if the government were allowed to break the law like it did in this
case, it would invite every person to break the law and would result in
anarchy. 4
Brandeis believed that invading the privacy of an electronic
communication was a far greater attack on privacy than the government
invading the privacy of a person's mail.45 At the time of the case, mail was
afforded privacy protection under the Fourth Amendment.46 Thus, in order
to protect the right to privacy, Justice Brandeis asserted that every intrusion
made by the government on someone's private life should be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. This policy of Fourth Amendment
privacy was later adopted in the Court's history in Katz v. United States.
47
42. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
43. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that the most important right
valued by American citizens is the fight to be left alone. Id. In order to protect this right, "every
unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. It is significant to note that
Justice Brandeis actually was referring to the telephone as a form of electric communication. He
stressed the importance of protecting electronic forms of communication, which could be seen as
comparable to digital documents. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (arguing that no
difference exists between a sealed mailed letter and a private telephone or electronic message).
44. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485. Justice Brandeis is advocating the Court's recognition of a right
to privacy and relying on the philosophical values motivating the Fourth Amendment. See also R.
Brian Black, Legislating U.S. Data Privacy in the Context of National Identification Numbers:
Models from South Africa and the United Kingdom, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 397, 414 (2001)
(stating that Justice Brandeis is focused on the desire to protect citizens from government
interference).
45. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475.
46. See id
47. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the lower court followed the holding in Olmstead and rejected
the defendant's claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the government had
not physically entered an area occupied by the defendant. Mark Elmore, Big Brother Where Art
Thou, Electronic Surveillance and the Internet: Carving Away Fourth Amendment Privacy
Protections, 32 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1053, 1059 (2001). It is paramount to note that in overturning
Olmstead, Katz erased a longstanding rule that Fourth Amendment protection only extended to
physical breaking and entering. This overturning affords an extension of the ruling to electronic
347
B. Katz v. United States4 : The Modern Approach
In Katz, the Court adopted Justice Brandeis's dissent and extended the
right of privacy to circumstances where the government did not physically
intrude on someone's private space.49 In the case, federal agents attached an
electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a public phone
booth in the belief that the defendant used the booth to transmit wagering
information by telephone. 0 The government, through this wiretapping,
found that Katz was transmitting wagering information via telephone, and
Katz was convicted.
Moving away from its tradition of requiring physical intrusion, the
Court held that Katz was entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for his
conversations and that a physical intrusion into the area he occupied was not
necessary to invoke the Amendment's protections.5  The Court rejected the
legal theory that Fourth Amendment protection extends only to
constitutionally protected areas. 2 In place of this theory, the Court
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protected people and not specific
places. 3 The Court stressed that it is imperative to understand where and
when someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy. It stated that the
Fourth Amendment "protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all.",54  But what creates these privacy
interests?
The Court recognizes that seeking to exclude someone from an area (in
this case, excluding others from hearing a conversation) is the starting point
on the road to creating a reasonable expectation of privacy.5 "[We] have
expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of
tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements,
overheard without any 'technical trespass under ... local property law."' 5 6
Additionally, the Court held that just because an "electronic device
employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the
communication, where many do not see a "physical intrusion."
48. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
49. Id. Katz was the first time the Court did not require there to be a physical entry in order to
make a claim for Fourth Amendment protection. Jennifer Mulhem Granholm, Video Surveillance on
Public Streets: The Constitutionality of Invisible Citizen Searches, 64 U. DET. L. REV., 687, 691 n.
24(1987).
50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
51. Id. at 354-59.
52. Id. at 350.
53. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 350.
55. Id. at 352.
56. Id. at 353.
348
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booth can have no constitutional significance. 57 Justice Harlan concurred
and constructed what would become the current test of what is
constitutionally protected as "private": whether someone had a reasonable
expectation of privacy.58
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, came up with a two-part test
that is currently used to determine whether there is a reasonable expectation
of privacy as to create the need for a warrant for government entry. 59 The
test requires one to ask whether there is a subjective expectation of privacy
and whether that subjective expectation of privacy is one that "society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
60
As a result, "[t]he scope of the modem Fourth Amendment is based
upon whether a reasonably held expectation of privacy has been violated,
and not upon the place invaded or even the meanings of the word
'search."''61 "'[T]he Court now uses the notion of... a 'legitimate
expectation of privacy'. . . to identify, at least in part, those interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment. If no such expectation is invaded, it is
generally said that no 'search' has occurred.' 62  On the contrary, when a
reasonable expectation of privacy is found, then the Fourth Amendment is
activated and a warrant is necessary to conduct a search.63 As long as a
57. ld. This passage is extremely relevant to encryption technology. The Court stated that no
physical entry has to occur, and there does not have to be a physical barrier protecting a private area.
This is similar to encryption where there is only a digital protection, and invading the encrypted
document does not require any physical invasion. It could be argued that encryption does not
penetrate or break anything. Kerr, supra note 9, at 520-24. The Court has moved away from the
property law concept of invasion and has expanded the doctrine to include electronic
communications. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (protecting the privacy interest of a
cellular phone conversation). It began to completely move away from the property law doctrine of
trespass in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (holding that audio surveillance through
a wall is a violation of Defendant's Fourth Amendment right to privacy). The Court has continued
this trend with Katz.
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. The Court, however, has never said what exactly constitutes a
"reasonable expectation of privacy." It has, nevertheless, laid down some factors to be considered
when determining a privacy right: intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); the ways in which the individual has used a location, Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265 (1960); and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve
the most protection from government invasion, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
59. Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-62 (Harlan, J., concurring). This test is later adopted by the majority in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
60. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
61. Timothy B. Lennon, Comment, The Fourth Amendment's Prohibitions on Encryption
Limitation: Will 1995 Be Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REV. 467, 482 (1994) (citing Katz, 347 US at 350).
62. Id. (citing Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of
"Searches " in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 322 (1984)).
63. See id
reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a communication, an
infringement upon that expectation will require adherence to the Fourth
Amendment.64
C. Specific Application of the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Rule to
Encryption
It can be argued that encryption provides the same expectation of
privacy as the expectation acknowledged in Katz. This is because the Court
has held that when a person takes affirmative steps to ensure that their
property remains private, an expectation of privacy is created that is equal to
the protection that exists in one's locked briefcase, home, or trunk.65 The
process of encryption creates protection that is parallel-if not better-than
the protection that exists with a locked box or sealed envelope.66 Because
digital encryption works to ensure that the individual encrypting the
document can control access to the document, just like a locked container, a
sense of complete privacy exists.67
This sense of complete privacy when encrypting a document should be
seen as an affirmative step aimed at creating a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Those that actually encrypt their documents are taking affirmative
steps above and beyond the steps taken by regular computer users. Those
that encrypt are attempting to ensure that their documents will remain secure
by building an electronic safe around their electronic property. As a
consequence, it can be argued that someone that encrypts is exhibiting an
actual expectation of privacy in relation to specific documents that he or she
64. Id.
65. These affirmative steps have to satisfy the two-part test from Katz and Terry. The Court has
determined that locking a box can create a reasonable expectation of privacy--'[a] container which
can support a reasonable expectation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause,
without a warrant." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984). The Court has also
determined that there is a reasonable expectation in a locked footlocker, and that there is not a
reduced expectation of privacy in that footlocker just because it is in public view. United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977). "Respondents principal privacy interest in the footlocker was, of
course, not in the container itself, which was exposed to public view, but in its contents." Id. at 13-
14 n.8.
66. See generally supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text on the process of encryption. The
Court has determined that "[1letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in
which the public at large has a legitimate expectation of privacy; warrantless searches of such effects
are presumptively unreasonable." United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). The Court
has held that there can be a reasonable expectation of privacy in a storage locker, United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984); in closed luggage, Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 434 n.3
(1981); and in a double-locked footlocker, United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977).
67. Jim Nesbitt, Keeping it Confidential: Taking Charge of lnternet Privacy, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, May 30, 2000, at Computer Link 1 (arguing that "[e]ncryption can be used to regain [a]
sense of privacy and the sense of control over the information."); Peter Lunt, The Electronic
Consumer: www.confidence, CONSUMER POLICy REVIEW, Nov. 1, 1999, at Vol. 9, Iss. 6.
350
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encrypts. It does not seem any more reasonable to place an object in a
sealed envelope or lockbox than it does to digitally encrypt the object to
make it just as invisible to the naked eye.68 If encryption is denied the
constitutional protections that are afforded to locked boxes, then an illogical
requirement for search and seizure protection will be created: computer
users are going to need to print out their digital documents and then lock
them in a safe. This would seem counterintuitive.
D. Rights-based Conceptions of the Fourth Amendment: Current Exceptions
do not Exempt Encryption from Fourth Amendment Protection
Over time the Supreme Court has carved out a number of exceptions to
the rights-based expectation of privacy. In a number of well-cited cases, the
Court has maintained that a mere expectation of privacy does not necessarily
mean that there is a recognizable constitutional privacy interest. 69 The Court
looks to a rights-based approach to analyze whether or not there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy.70 In each of its cases, the Court has
dismissed a statistical approach to claiming that a right to privacy is
present.7' Moreover, the Court has held that just because it is statistically
reasonable to believe that activities or substances will remain private does
not mean that there is a constitutionally protected interest of privacy in those
activities or substances. 72  In each landmark case, the Court defines
exceptions that should not mistakenly be translated into a formula that
makes encryption a constitutionally unprotected means of privacy. 3
68. According to the Court, placing a document in a safe or envelope does create a reasonable
expectation of privacy. United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984).
69. See United States v. Jacobson, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971) (holding that the use of agents who themselves may reveal the contents of conversations with
an individual does not violate a Fourth Amendment right to privacy); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the government from
obtaining confidential information from third-parties who the accused was statistically reasonable in
believing would not tell anyone else).
70. See generally Kerr, supra note 9, at 507 (arguing that an "expectation is constitutionally
reasonable or 'legitimate' when it is backed by an enforceable, extraconstitutional right to enjoin the
government's invasion of privacy").
71. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (White, J., plurality) (holding that viewing
the defendant's greenhouse from a low-flying helicopter was not a search because the fact that it was
statistically improbable for someone to fly over in a helicopter it did not mean that there was a
reasonable expectation of privacy).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 109; Riley,_488 U.S. at 445.
In United States v. Jacobsen, the appellant complained that the field test
conducted on the cocaine he possessed when he was searched violated his
Fourth Amendment right because of his belief that the contents of the
powder would remain secret. 74 In response to this, the Court held that the
field test merely determined whether or not the particular substance was
cocaine, and did not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.75 The
Court noted that cocaine is an illegal matter and that the field test destroyed
only a trace amount of the substance.76 From this, it could be argued that
decoding an encrypted document does nothing to destroy its contents and
thus, under Jacobsen, there is no unconstitutional search or seizure.
However, this argument is defective.
The Court's holding in Jacobsen does not apply to deciphering
encrypted documents. Unlocking an encrypted document is like breaking
open a locked box and then searching its contents. If the government is in
possession of an encrypted, locked document, the government will have to
break apart the document with a supercomputer to see its contents.78 The
encryption process could be analogized to Jacobsen: just as none of the
cocaine was lost in the field test, encryption does not destroy any physical
properties. Nevertheless, in cyberspace this would be like breaking open a
box. Just because there is the possibility of digital reassembly does not
mean that there is no expectation of privacy.
7 9
In Florida v. Riley, a defendant growing marijuana in his backyard
attempted to ensure that no one knew of the illegal activity by building a
fence and modest covering over the marijuana so it could not be seen from
the street. 80  The government flew a helicopter over the property and
discovered the drugs in the greenhouse. 8' The defendant complained that he
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the enclosed area and that the
74. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 112.
75. Id. at 122-23.
76. Id. at 125.
77. In cyberspace, while the encrypted document can be "repaired" once it is deciphered by re-
encrypting it, the analogy fails. This is analogous to saying that it is okay to break open a locked
box because it can be put back together again.
78. The word "break" in this context is used in a cyber sense, where entering into a document
would be like entering into an envelope in the physical world-there would have to be a break.
79. I plan to flesh out this argument by demonstrating that encryption creates a virtual lockbox
around the contents of the document. Furthermore, making the argument that just because nothing is
really lost when the file is deciphered would mean that nothing in cyberspace could be protected
since there could really be no "breaking and entering."
80. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989) The Court, while upholding an aerial search,
noted that police did not observe any intimate details during the search. id. at 452. The Court noted
that if the helicopter had been flying at an illegal altitude, then a different result would have been
achieved. Id. at 451.
81. Id. at 448.
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government should have procured a warrant before flying over. 12 In
considering this claim, the Court responded that the government could go
anywhere that is legally accessible to the public.83 In addition, it found that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in areas that can be viewed or
legally accessed by the public.84 The Court noted that while the defendants
could have rationally expected their fences and structure to create privacy
around their drugs, no law or recognized social practice allowed the
defendants to enjoin law enforcement from entering public space in a
helicopter in order to view the land below it-it is an activity that anyone
85can participate in.
The holding of this case can be used to argue that while there is a social
practice-albeit a very narrowly defined one amongst users of encryption
and computers-that encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy,
it is a case of misplaced confidence. Riley demonstrates that when someone
mistakenly believes that he is working in a private area that can be seen by
no one else or where no one else will reveal the secrets he has told them, his
beliefs are not controlling where there is no complete privacy (like the area
viewable by the helicopter).86 But encryption is functionally different from
this case. Encryption is not an open field-it is a completely sealed digital
82. Id. at451-52.
83. Id. at 449 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)). However, just because
something, is accessible to the public does not mean that there cannot still be a reasonable
expectation of privacy. United States v. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 171 (1984). Courts have extended the
Katz doctrine to include areas that could possibly be visible by the public eye. See, e.g., United
States v. Mullinex, 508 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Ky. 1980) (holding that a person may have an
expectation of privacy in an open field if society would consider it reasonable); United States v.
DeBacker, 493 F. Supp. 1078, 1080-81 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (holding that the government should not
be given carte blanche to search areas outside the curtilage as a matter of course); Dean v. Superior
Court, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973) (finding that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test is
more appropriate because the open fields doctrine is reminiscent of a constitutionally protected areas
approach); State v. Brady, 406 So. 2d 1093, 1096 (Fla. 1981) (holding that the open fields doctrine
may receive Fourth Amendment protection if it passes both prongs of the Katz test). When arguing
that Riley is applicable to encryption, it should be noted that there are myriad exceptions that seem to
trace back to the primary test of Katz: whether society deems it reasonable to have an expectation of
privacy in a particular area.
84. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449.
85. Kerr, supra note 9, at 510 (internal citations omitted). See also, California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (finding the observation of a backyard from a plane in public airspace to be
permissible despite six foot outer fence and ten foot inner fence around backyard because the
property was still viewable from areas of public access).
86. See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (holding that individuals cannot
rely on their confidence that co-participants in illicit activities will not disclose their crimes); Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when defendant
invited an undercover agent into his home to buy narcotics).
area that cannot be viewed by anyone without a key. The confidence and
reliance on the privacy aspect of encryption is not "misplaced." In the cyber
world, it is the physical equivalent of a steal, sealed box.87
V. WHY ENCRYPTION SUCCEEDS IN CREATING A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY WHERE OTHER "ENCODINGS" FAIL:
AN ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW
The encryption process locks a document and keeps it safe from
intruding eyes by affording significant security features. Supercomputers
sometimes require hundreds or thousands of years to decrypt a document.
Moreover, a document's owner can control who can see the document's
content, and without deciphering an encrypted document it is virtually
invisible.88 It seems that with all of the protections encryption provides,
courts will find that encryption provides a reasonable expectation of privacy
that is protected under the Fourth Amendment. However, it might be argued
that federal and state case law demonstrates that courts will not be willing to
give encryption Fourth Amendment protection.
In a recently published journal article, Professor Orin Kerr argues that
three noteworthy cases that apply the reasonable expectation standard
demonstrate that encryption fails to satisfy a constitutionally protected
method of privacy. 89 This section attempts to analyze the same three cases
that Kerr cites in order to demonstrate that encryption in cyberspace can be
found by the court to be in the purview of the Fourth Amendment. All three
cases demonstrate situations where "coding" efforts failed to provide a
reasonable expectation of privacy. The courts' reasoning is essential to
understanding why digital encryption is not comparable to these three
specific situations and to understanding how digital encryption provides
what the courts say is lacking to create a reasonable expectation of privacy.
87. See supra notes 12 -31 and accompanying text for discussion of encryption and power of the
encryption key. This analogy comes from the fact that the encryption locks a document in a fashion
that requires someone who wants to view it to have an encryption key-similar to a locked box or
trunk. It takes most computers hundreds or thousands of years to view an encrypted document
without this encryption key.
88. See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text on the process of encryption.
89. Kerr, supra note 9, at 513-17. Orin Kerr is a professor at George Washington University
School of law. He has served as a trial attorney in the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section of the Criminal Division at the U.S. Department of Justice. Professor Kerr developed
special expertise in computer search and seizure and electronic privacy law. Information on
Professor Kerr is available at http://www.law.gwu.edu/fac/faculty.asp?pkey_f=96.
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A. United States v. Longoria"
In Longoria, members of a narcotics conspiracy "encoded" their
communications by speaking in Spanish when they were around non-
conspirators. 9' Thinking that the other people could not understand Spanish,
the coconspirators spoke openly about their illegal plans.92 Mistakenly,
however, they discussed their plans to conduct drug transactions in the
presence of a government informant who recorded the conversation and later
translated it into English.93 Defendants argued that they had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their communications because they were encoded
in Spanish.94 The court rejected the defendant's argument in Longoria and
stated that there is no constitutionally reasonable expectation of privacy in
these clearly audible conversations. 95 "[O]ne exposing conversations to
others must necessarily assume the risk his statements will be overheard and
understood. 96 The defendant "exposed his statements by speaking in a
manner clearly audible by the informant. His hope that the informant would
not fully understand the contents of the conversation is not an expectation
'society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'
97
90. 177 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 1999). The court focused on the two part test to determine whether
a defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy if: "(1) the defendant had an actual, subjective
expectation of privacy-i.e., that his communications were not subject to interception; and (2) the
defendant's expectation is one society would objectively consider reasonable." Id. at 1181-82.
91. Id. at 1183.
92. Id. at 1181.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1182. The defendant did not make an "encoding" argument, but stated that he "did not
'knowingly expose' his conversations to the informant because he spoke in a language he believed
the informant could not understand." Id. at 1183. It could be argued that this is similar to
encryption, because it creates a language that can only be understood by one who knows the
language, essentially the one who has the encryption key.
95. Id. at 1184.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1183 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1961) (Harlan, J. concurring)).
See also Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1320 (9th Cir.1994) (concluding that a defendant had
no expectation of privacy in conversations conducted in Thai in the presence of a police officer); In
re Matter of John Doe Trader Number One, 894 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations conducted on trading floor in presence of
government agent); United States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 173 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that a
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations conducted in informant's
presence).
355
Kerr uses this case to argue that the coding that occurs in encryption is
similar to the coding of English to Spanish.98 Thus, applying the reasoning
of Longoria, encryption is not protected under the Fourth Amendment.99 He
recognizes that the court said that there was no expectation of privacy in
speaking in a foreign tongue, even when you have knowledge that the other
people in the room do not understand the language.' 00 Utilizing this case,
encryption does not create a reasonable expectation of privacy when you
analogize foreign language with encryption where someone is trying to
protect a communication by making it incomprehensible to anyone else.' 0'
However, this argument is flawed in its comparison and does not create a
prototypical use of encryption in the digital world.
Encryption encodes a digital document and leaves the user with only the
key. The Court has determined that this kind of restricted access creates a
reasonable expectation of privacy.10 2  Utilizing Spanish as a mode of
encryption can be analogized to the digital forms, only allowing over 300
million people-the number of Spanish speakers in the world-to have the
key. 0 3 Accordingly, it seems, the court was right in saying that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy from encrypting a communication in a
globally spoken language. However, encryption does not work like an
international language. 0 4  There is only one code that can decipher the
98. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 513-17. Kerr states, "[1]n [Longoria, Scott, and Copenhefer] the
police officers recovered the secret communications, and the defendants argued that the
government's actions violated their 'reasonable expectation of privacy' because a reasonable person
would have expected that their secrets would remain safe." Id. at 513. The foundation for his
argument that these cases apply to encryption is that "in all three cases, the courts rejected the
defendants' claims and held that decoding the defendants' communications without a warrant did not
violate the Fourth Amendment." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 515-16 (citing Longoria, 177 F.3d at 1183-84).
101. Seeid at515-16.
102. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 801, 822-23 (1982) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment "provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from
plain view" and suggesting that a warrant would have been required to search a "'lunch-type' brown
paper bag" and a "zippered red leather pouch" had they not been found in an automobile); United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111, 114-15 (1984) (suggesting that a warrantless search of an
"ordinary cardboard box wrapped in brown paper" would have violated the Fourth Amendment had
a private party not already opened it); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977) (asserting
that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a 200-pound "double-locked"
footlocker); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762-63 n.9 (1979) (noting that there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a small, unlocked suitcase); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428-29
(establishing that there is Fourth Amendment protection in packages wrapped in green opaque
plastic).
103. Rodrigo Lara Serrano, Muzo: Hay in Argentin en Misopa, 1. BIZ, Apr. 2000, at 53 (stating
that there are more than 388 million Spanish-speakers in the world). In 1999, the Summer Institute
for Linguistics Ethnologue Survey estimated there to be 332 million Spanish speakers in the world.
at http://www2.ignatius.edu/faculty/tumer/worldlang.htm and on file with author (last visited Sept.
1,2002).
104. See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text on encryption process.
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message and not 300 million of them that can be used. If individuals are
speaking a language unique to the two of them-an equivalent to
encryption-then there should be a reasonable expectation of privacy.
There is another reason why analogizing this foreign language case to
encryption is invalid: the court focused on the fact that the defendants
assumed the risk when they were transmitting conversations in locations
inhabited by others.0 5 In the typical encryption situation, the only person to
see the document is the user, and the transmission happens completely in the
confines of the computer. It seems that encryption is exceptionally different
than spoken language in this way. Thus, an extension of Longoria to say
that encryption also is not constitutionally protected is tenuous at best. It is
significant that the court notes that the communication would be protected if
it passed the two-part test.16
B. United States v. Scott'07
In Scott, the defendant shredded evidence of his income tax evasion and
placed those shredded documents in the trash. 0 8 After searching through the
trash, the government seized these documents and reconstructed them to
their original form.'09 The defendant argued that he had a reasonable
expectation in shredded documents because once they were shredded they
became virtually unreadable to anyone else."0  The court rejected this
argument completely,"' finding that there is no expectation of privacy in
anything thrown into the garbage." 2 Aside from basing the case on a theory
of abandonment, the court also noted that the police can use technology to
decode "secret messages.." "There is no constitutional requirement that
police techniques in the detection of crime must remain stagnant while those
intent on keeping their nefarious activities secret have the benefit of new
knowledge.""' 3 The court stressed:
105. United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999).
106. Id.
107. 975 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1992).
108. Id. at 928.
109. Id.
110. Id.
Ill. Id. at 931.
112. Id. at 929. "In our view, a person who places trash at a curb to be disposed of or destroyed by
a third person abandons it because '[i]mplicit in the concept of abandonment is a renunciation of any
reasonable expectation of privacy in the property abandoned."' Id. (quoting United States v.
Mustone 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972)).
113. Id.at930.
357
A person who prepares incriminatory documents in a secret
code ... and thereafter blithely discards them as trash, relying on
the premise or hope that they will not be deciphered ... cannot
make a valid claim that his subjective expectation in keeping the
contents private by use of the secret code [or language] was
reasonable in a constitutional sense."
14
However, the court's rationale is conjunctive: the holding was based on
the fact that the defendant shredded the paper and threw the "secret code"
into the garbage. 1 5 Courts have had a longstanding history of discharging
all Fourth Amendment protection from anything thrown into the garbage. 16
As a consequence, Scott does not translate into a holding that strikes down
constitutional protection from encrypted documents.
But Kerr extends the holding of this case and states that its rationale is
applicable to encryption. 17  His analogy maintains that shredding a
document into unrecognizable pieces is like encryption."' Nevertheless,
even if this analogy were correct, it would only illustrate a rule in situations
where a document "encoder" throws away encoded documents. 19  Many
cases have held that placing objects in the trash extinguishes your reasonable
expectation of privacy in the objects. 2 ' Scott just extends that abandonment
proposition. It merely shows that if an encrypted document is thrown in the
trash, then that document loses Fourth Amendment protection-there is no
114. Id. (emphasis added) (internal punctuation omitted).
115. Id.
116. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) ("[H]aving deposited their garbage in
an area particularly suited for public inspection and, in a manner of speaking, public consumption,
for the express purpose of having strangers take it... respondents could have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the inculpatory items that they discarded." (quoting United States v.
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (Cal. 3rd 1981))). See also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304
(stating that an erection of ranch type fences in an open field does not create a constitutionally
protected privacy interest); United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1991) (placing trash
bags within barrels inside defendant's lawn not entitled to elevated "expectation of privacy"
respecting the trash).
117. Kerr, supra note 9, at 513-15.
"In all three cases, the police officers recovered the secret communications, and the
defendants argued that the government's actions violated their 'reasonable expectation of
privacy' because a reasonable person would have expected that their secrets would
remain safe. In all three cases, the courts rejected the defendants' claims and held that
decoding the defendants' communications without a warrant did not violate the Fourth
Amendment."
Id. at 513.
118. See id.
119. See Scott, 975 F.2d at 930.
120. See supra note 116 (discussing the trash-abandonment theory) and specifically California v.
Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 35 (1988) (holding that the "Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
warrantless search or seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home").
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indication from this case that encryption does not have Fourth Amendment
protection. '
2
While the court does note that law enforcement should not have to sit
idle to the invention of new technology, the paper-shredding technique by
nature creates less privacy than digital encryption. Unlike paper shredding,
digital encryption makes it impossible to read a document. 22 While it could
be argued that the court is saying that the police should be able to keep up
with the encryption techniques and use them to decipher anything, this is
missing the court's main point: because the defendant threw his encrypted
document in the trash, he no longer could expect it to be kept safe.' He
effectively discharged his reasonable expectation of privacy when he threw
away the shredded documents. 124 To support this argument, a number of
cases have held that Scott was decided on a strict abandonment theory. 125
C. Commonwealth v. Copenhefer
126
In Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, Copenhefer was convicted of
kidnapping and murder after police conducted a search of his home during a
murder investigation. 127  During the search, the government seized
Copenhefer's computer pursuant to a valid search warrant.128 Once in its
possession, the government used computer software designed to retrieve
files previously deleted and recovered files that Copenhefer believed he had
destroyed. 129 These files contained inculpatory evidence linking Copenhefer
121. See Scott, 975 F.2d at 927-31.
122. See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
123. See Scott, 975 F.2d at 929-30.
124. Id.
125. See United States v. Redmon, 138 F.3d 1109, 1131 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the
abandonment theory was used in Scott); State v. DeFusco, 620 A.2d 746 (Conn. 1993) (noting that
Scott argued that just because one shreds his trash doesn't mean he has any different expectation of
privacy in it than regular trash). See also A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key:
Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 823-26 (1995).
Froomkin argues that "Fourth Amendment privacy in this context begins with the premise that
people have control over who knows what about them and 'the right to shape the 'self that they
present[] to the world. This control is protected by the Fourth Amendment freedom from unlawful
searches and seizures."' Id. at 826 n. 496. (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 12-1 (2d ed. 1988)).
126. 587 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1991).
127. Id. at 1354-55.
128. Id. at 1355.
129. Id. at 1356.
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to murder and kidnapping.' 30  Copenhefer argued that the government's
seizure of the electronic documents that he believed he had deleted from his
computer constituted an impermissible violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights.' 3' He contended that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the files because he thought he had destroyed them and had a "hope of
achieving secrecy. 132
The court rejected Copenhefer's argument, stating that Copenhefer
merely had a hope of privacy when he deleted the files and because the files
were still in the computer's memory they could be recovered by any means
that the government could employ. 133 In essence, the court is stating that
merely hoping that something remains secret is not enough to create a
reasonable expectation of privacy. When a file is deleted, a computer does
not really dispose of it, but merely pushes it to the side and makes it
available to be used if needed. 34 When file space is needed, these pushed-
aside files are overwritten and become no longer recoverable. 35  When
Copenhefer deleted his files they were not actually destroyed; they were just
moved. Accordingly, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in files
merely believed to be secret because there was no actual protection-the
files were still there.
136
Copenhefer does not translate to a proposition that encryption is similar
to failing to permanently remove files from one's computer, which would
render no Fourth Amendment protection. Orin Kerr offers this case to argue
how courts will rule on encrypted documents. 37  In addition to Kerr's
130. Id. at 1355.
131. Id. at 1354.
132. Id. at 1356.
133. Id. "A mere hope for secrecy is not a legally protected expectation .... At best, [Defendant]
had the hope of achieving secrecy, but his hope did not prohibit the state from subjecting validly
seized physical evidence from any scientific analysis possible within current technology." Id.
134. Jim Williams, Deleted Files Still There, at http://netsecurity.about.com/library/weekly/
aa070300a.htm and on file with author (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
135. Id. The article notes that it is fairly easy to recover deleted documents:
With the right software, it is relatively easy to recover deleted files from your hard drive.
Some file recovery software can even work over a network connection. What this means
is that if you have confidential information or documents on your computer, simply
deleting them does not get rid of them and an enterprising person could, if he or she
wanted to, get at those files on your hard drive and see your confidential information.
Id
136. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d at 1356. The court notes that "[a]ppellant's unsuccessful attempt to
delete documents or files from his computer did not create a legally protected expectation of privacy
which would have required a second warrant before the prosecution applied technology to elicit the
content of files buried in the memory of the computer." Id (emphasis added).
137. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 513, 516-17. Kerr also extends this case further by arguing:
The same would be true of a diary recorded in a private code. If we accepted appellant's
argument, after seizing the diary pursuant to a valid search warrant, the state would be
obligated to obtain a second warrant before it could attempt to read the diary by
deciphering the code. Yet the diarist's obvious attempt to achieve secrecy does not create
360
(Vol. 30: 339, 2003] Double Clicking on Fourth Amendment Protection
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
argument, it could be argued that deleting a file is just like encrypting a file,
which is an attempt to make the file unreadable by others. If this were the
case, Copenhefer would lay the foundation for no Fourth Amendment
protection in encrypted documents. However, encryption is different than
merely hitting the delete key.
As stated in the encryption section of this article, encryption does not
create just a mere hope that the document will remain secret; it virtually
locks the document so no one but the user can read its contents.' a This is
the purpose of the encryption. So while it can be argued that deleting a
document achieves the same effect, this is not actually the case. 139 Deleting
a document does not fully erase or secure the document so that no one else
will read it. Deletion is just a "mere hope for secrecy.' '140 Encryption, in
contrast, actually creates privacy in a document by not allowing anyone else
to read it.
141
In addition to pointing out the flawed reasoning in applying the above
three cases to digital encryption, there seems to be cases that support the
proposition that encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy.
D. Cases That Support the Protection of Encrypted Documents
In Texas v. Brown, police made a plain view seizure of a balloon filled
with narcotics at an investigatory stop. 142 The Court found the search of the
car to be valid under the plain view doctrine. 43 However, in his concurring
opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the plain view doctrine justified the
a legally protected expectation of privacy nor the need to obtain a warrant before
subjecting legally seized physical evidence to scientific testing and analysis to make it
divulge its secrets.
Id. at 517.
138. See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
139. See id.
140. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d at 1356.
141. It has been argued that Copenhefer would have been helped by encryption in this case
because deleting made a file still recoverable by the government. A. Michael Froomkin, The
Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
709, 729 n.62 (1995). This is the argument presented here: while deleting the file is merely a hope
for privacy because it does not actually get rid of a file, encryption actually protects documents by
getting rid of the possibility of someone else seeing them.
142. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 733-34 (1983).
143. Id. at 744. The Court noted, however, that "[o]ur cases hold that procedure by way of
warrant is preferred." Id. at 735.
seizure of the party balloon, but additional justification was required to open
the balloon without a warrant.
144
The concurrence can be analogized to a situation where the government
legally seizes information, but where there is still a reasonable expectation
of privacy in the objects found. In this situation, a warrant would be needed
to search further. Analogously, encryption could be treated as the balloon in
Brown because it covers the document and creates a privacy interest.
Reasoning with Justice Stevens, encryption would create a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
While case law tends to demonstrate courts' trend toward granting
encryption Fourth Amendment protection, or at least demonstrating that
courts have not yet excluded encryption from protection, it could be argued
that in situations where police seize a computer filled with encrypted
documents, there is no need for another search warrant to decrypt the files.
This argument would be based on the premise that the government should
lawfully be able to do whatever it takes to get at these documents if they are
legally using a computer or have legally seized the hard drive. However,
courts have responded to this argument in other situations. United States v.
Turk145 shows that there can be an additional reasonable expectation of
privacy in items lawfully searched. Reasoning under Turk, if encryption is
afforded Fourth Amendment protection, then encrypted files would have
additional protection if the government had legally seized the object that
contained these digital documents.
This type of additional protection is seen in United States v. Block.14 In
Block, the defendant was living with his mother. 147 The defendant's mother
had free access to the defendant's room and used that access to consent to a
search of his room by the government. 48 However, while her consent to
search the room was valid, the court held that she did not have the authority
144. Id. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring). It is significant to note Justice Stevens's reasoning in this
case:
[I]f there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband, the owner's possessory
interest in the container must yield to society's interest in making sure that the contraband
does not vanish during the time it would take to obtain a warrant. The item may be seized
temporarily. It does not follow, however, that the container may be opened on the spot.
Once the container is in custody, there is no risk that evidence will be destroyed. Some
inconvenience to the officer is entailed by requiring him to obtain a warrant before
opening the container, but that alone does not excuse the duty to go before a neutral
magistrate.
Id. at 749-50.
145. 526 F.2d 654 (5"' Cir. 1976) (holding that although the seizure of a tape was proper, playing
the taped conversation of private telephone communication was not because there was a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the tape).
146. 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978).
147. Id. at 537.
148. Id. at 541.
[Vol. 30: 339, 2003] Double Clicking on Fourth Amendment Protection
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
to consent to the search of a footlocker that was located in the room. 149 The
footlocker was afforded additional protection because it was a particular
object with an additional expectation of privacy.' 50 This situation is similar
to situations where the government has lawful access to a computer that they
are searching.
The abovementioned situation was addressed in Trulock v. Freeh.5' In
Trulock, the defendant's townhouse and computer were searched after the
defendant's roommate, who had access to all areas of the townhouse and
Defendant's computer, consented to a search of Defendant's property.
52
Among the things searched were the defendant's password protected
documents located in her computer's hard drive.1 53 The court held that the
search of the computer was valid. 54 However, the court found that the
search of the password-protected files was invalid because the files carried
an additional expectation of privacy.' 55  The court wrote: "[a]lthough
[Defendant's roommate] had authority to consent to a general search of the
computer, her authority did not extend to Trulock's password-protected
files."' 56 They reasoned that because the defendant concealed his password
and protected the files that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
5 7
While the court refused to recognize a clearly established right in regard to
password protected files'58, this decision shows that the trend of at least one
court is to afford password protected documents a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
VI. ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES SERVE AS THE LOCKS AND KEYS OF
CYBERSPACE
The lock-and-key metaphor, relating encryption to a physically locked
container, may be the lynchpin of unrolling the Fourth Amendment's
protective cover over encrypted documents. 59 If encryption is found to be
149. Id
150. Id.
151. 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).
152. Id. at 398.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 403.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See Froomkin, supra note 141; Michael Adler, Cyberspace, General Searches and Digital
Contraband: The Fourth Amendment and the Net- Wide Search, 105 YALE L.J. 1093 (1996); Lennon,
the cyber equivalent of physical locks and keys, then the Court will most
likely give the same Fourth Amendment protection to encryption that it has
given to certain physical containers that seal possessions.160  The Court
wrote that "[a] container which can support a reasonable expectation of
privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without a warrant.
161
Locking something is an effective expression of a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy.' 62  Consequently, a warrant is needed to open a
locked box 163 and, reasoning that encryption is similar, a warrant would have
to be obtained to "open" an encrypted document.
164
Orin Kerr argues that encryption does not work like a physical lock that
closes off objects from the eye. 165 Encryption, according to Kerr, works by
making something unrecognizable and thus does not work like a lock.
66
This argument is modernly lacking in that it does not correctly apply the
analogy to the digital world, where users expect encryption to act as a
lock. 67  The physical lockbox usually hides its contents with solid walls.
This makes the contents invisible by outsiders (which is typically the reason
someone would put something in the box). Encryption acts in the same way.
supra note 61, at 467.
160. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120, n.17 (1984).
161. Id.
162. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 658 (1980) (illustrating that wrapping or locking an
object manifests a reasonable expectation of privacy).
163. United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that the act of
locking a briefcase and then retaining the only means of access to it - a key or combination - is an
effective manifestation of an expectation of privacy). See also, United States v. Barry, 853 F.2d
1479, 1482 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in a locked suitcase left at
the Minneapolis-St. Paul Airport); United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (8th Cir. 1980)
(finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in a closed but unlocked leather tote bag).
164. Froomkin, supra note 141.
165. Kerr, supra note 9, at 520, 522-24.
166. Id. at 520-24. Kerr believes "[t]he trick to understanding why the Fourth Amendment
distinguishes between a physical lock-and-key and the lock of encryption is to realize that the two
cases rely on two very different meanings of the word 'lock."' Id. at 521. He distinguishes the two
by noting that a physical lock and key "limits the movement of two or more surfaces relative to each
other" while encryption locks a document by making the "communication inaccessible by making it
incomprehensible." Id. Kerr believes that encryption "locks" something by making it complex and
unintelligible to most. Id.
167. It is important to remember that the Court determines what someone reasonably expects
when they want privacy in addition to looking at whether society will accept the expectation as
reasonable. See supra notes 39-87 and accompanying text. Patrick Brethour, Hacker Hits Microsoft
Software Web Music Anti-Piracy Program Outfoxed, GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 23, 2001, at B4 (noting
that users employ "encryption technology to lock down content in whatever manner the author
specifies"); Shannon Tan, Program May Allow Hackers to Gain Data from Internet in Miami Area,
MIAMI HERALD, Aug 28, 2001; (noting individuals that use encryption to lock documents); John
Fontana, Public Key Infrastructure May Provide True E-Commerce Security, COLORADO Bus., July
1, 2001 ("A set of encryption keys that work in concert to lock and unlock information as part of
secure PKI transactions."). See generally Crain, supra note 4, at 870 (stating that "Encryption
technologies serve as the locks and keys of cyberspace.").
364
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Encryption makes a document invisible to outsiders that do not have the
key. Instead of using physical walls, it creates a digital wall by constructing
a set of symbols that mean nothing without the encryption key.
168
Encryption does not merely make a document "incomprehensible" or "hard
to understand;"' 169 encryption makes a document impossible to view, which
effectively creates a digital wall. 7 °
The fact that encryption achieves this digital wall through encoding,
creating an "incomprehensible" language, is inconsequential to the analogy.
The incomprehensible symbols that an encryption engine creates are the
very basic particles to the encryption. In cyberspace these symbols would be
equivalent to the atoms that compose the physical world. It would be
ridiculous to argue in the physical world that since we could decode the
atomic code and see through the locked box utilizing an x-ray that there
should be no Fourth Amendment protection to this atomically
"incomprehensible" locked box. The same analogy seems foolish in
cyberspace.
VII. CONCLUSION
If this issue is ever presented to the Supreme Court, the Court should
hold that encryption creates a reasonable expectation of privacy and is thus
protected under the Fourth Amendment. The process of encryption provides
more security and protection than most things in the physical world. It
seems logical to afford privacy protection to something that secures data so
well that a supercomputer would have to work thousands of years to break
the protection. The framers of the Constitution used encryption to protect
their documents. With this, it is argued that they had encryption in mind
when they were proposing the right to privacy. The evolution of the right to
privacy demonstrates that the Court seems to want to cover encryption under
Fourth Amendment protection. It also seems that current courts are starting
to move toward affording electronic communications, especially ones that
have been encrypted, Fourth Amendment protection. It becomes apparent
168. See supra notes 12-31 and accompanying text.
169. See Kerr, supra note 9, at 521.
170. Id. This is meant to refute Kerr's argument that encryption just makes something hard to
understand, but not impossible to understand. However, it does create the question: how
incomprehensible is incomprehensible enough for the Fourth Amendment? From previous case law
it would appear that completely sealed objects create a reasonable expectation of privacy. Does
encryption create a completely sealed object? From the perspective of the layperson encryption is
unbreakable. From the perspective of a supercomputer, it could take up to 1000 years (or be
impossible altogether) to pick the cyber-lock.
that encryption will be protected when described in terms of the lock-and-
key analogy. With all of this, it seems that encryption is not only a method
that can be used reasonably to expect to keep data private, but also a method
that is constitutionally protected.
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